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Abstract—Mobile crowdsensing is a new paradigm that sharing
sensing data collected by mobile devices such as smartphones and
tablets. As mobile devices are usually connected by an oppor-
tunistic network for data transferring, it is hard to acknowledge
the contribution of each mobile user in network forwarding then
find a sustainable incentive mechanism. In this paper, we propose
a software defined opportunistic network (SDON) scheme for
mobile crowdsensing. We design a centralized control structure to
manage the opportunistic network and mobile crowdsensing. By
the centralized structure, we also design an incentive mechanism
for data forwarding and collection in an SDON and solve
the optimal decision of mobile devices and the sensing service
provider. From the extensive simulation results, our incentive
mechanism performs better than original solutions.
Index Terms—Sustainable mobile crowdsensing, opportunistic
network, software defined networking (SDN), incentive mecha-
nism
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, more and more mobile devices equip
sensors such as cameras, accelerometers, digital compasses
to support various mobile applications [1]. Meanwhile, these
sensors provide rich information about the environment and
users’ activities, which are also important sources to measure
phenomena of different interest. Mobile crowdsensing is such
a new paradigm that organizes the mobile devices and col-
lects richness information then provide sensing services for
different purposes [2] [3].
For mobile crowdsensing, a significant issue is the incentive
mechanism as sensing and data forwarding brings additional
energy consumption to participants. As the final sensing infor-
mation is numerous valuable, the sensing service provider can
spend part of the revenue to motivate mobile users to provide
sensing. Usually, the sensing service provider can return some
revenue to mobile users who contribute valuable sensing data.
Since the cellular network consumes a large amount energy
to transfer large sensing data, an opportunistic network is very
appropriate for transferring information. In an opportunistic
network, mobile devices can transfer information each without
determined forwarding route, which is an efficient solution for
sensing data forwarding in mobile crowdsensing. A difficulty
is the incentive mechanism is ignorant of the forwarding route.
However, it is hard to measure the contribution of mobile
users who forward data in the opportunistic network. Users
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will escape data forwarding without incentives, and it is hard
to maintain a sustainable network for mobile crowdsensing.
Software defined networking (SDN) is an urgent method-
ology to manage the opportunistic network [4]. SDN de-
couples the data plane and control plane and manages the
data forwarding through a centralized controller, which is
also able to acknowledge the data forwarding activities of
each mobile device. In this paper, we propose a software
defined opportunistic network (SDON) structure for mobile
crowdsensing. SDON provides find-grained management of
the opportunistic network and records the user contributions
in data forwarding through accurate statics.
Therefore, we present a sustainable incentive mechanism
that returns cellular network traffic to mobile users who con-
tribute in mobile crowdsensing, including data collection and
forwarding. The incentives for data forwarding can reduce the
packet loss then increase energy efficiency since users can re-
ceive reimbursements for their additional power consumption
in data forwarding. We study the payoff of mobile users and
the sensing service provider and formulate the optimization
of the incentive mechanism as a leader/follower Stackelberg
game. We find the optimal solutions for mobile users and the
sensing service provider by solving the convex optimization
problems. To evaluate our solution in mobile crowdsensing,
we execute extensive simulations, and the results show our
solution performs better than original solutions.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• We first proposed an SDON structure for the data for-
warding management in crowdsensing. Since the SDON
is a prospective methodology, our work is the first work
that focuses on mobile crowdsensing in an SDON.
• We then design the sustainable incentive mechanism by
returning cellular traffic to participants, including data
collection and forwarding. It is a challenging problem
which needs to understand thoroughly the mobile crowd-
sensing.
• We model the interaction of the sensing service provider
and mobile users as a two-stage Stackelberg game and
analyze the game equilibrium. A generic analysis with
variable system settings is used for applicability of dif-
ferent mobile crowdsensing scenarios.
• We take the performance evaluation of the strategy with
extensive simulations with settings from sensing data
from realistic mobile devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discussed the related works of mobile crowdsensing and
2software defined wireless networks. Section III presents the
structure of SDON and the incentive mechanism for mobile
crowdsensing. The Stackelberg game based incentive mech-
anism optimization is described in Section IV. Section V
evaluates the proposed incentive mechanism performance in
SDON through extensive simulations. Finally, this paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first discuss some related works about
crowdsensing and opportunistic networks then introduce the
software defined wireless networking.
A. Mobile crowdsensing and opportunistic networks
Several types of networks are able to support mobile crowd-
sensing. A straightforward method is transferred sensing data
through cellular networks. Since most places are covered by
cellular signals, mobile devices can directly upload their col-
lected data to the sensing servers through carrier’s networks.
However, cellular links are not appropriate for crowdsensing
because of the unacceptable cost for a large amount of sensing
data [5].
A mobile ad hoc network (MONET) is another solution
for mobile crowdsensing [6]. Some works proposed different
forwarding strategies for mobile crowdsensing in a MONET.
The cost and energy consumption of data transferring with a
MONET is much cheaper than that with the cellular network.
As the connectivity becomes worse with a lower density of
mobile devices, a MONET only works well in the scenarios
with dense devices. For transferring data in a sparse mobility
environment, some works focus on mobile crowdsensing in
a delay tolerant network (DTN). Even though the forwarding
path is not always needed by data transferring, the DTN is not
efficient because of the ”store and forward” approach [7].
By integrating the merits from MONETs and DTNs, an
opportunistic network seems appropriate for mobile crowd-
sensing. Sensing data can be transferred by different links from
the source to the destination. When there is no forwarding
path to the destination, the sensing data can be stored in
the relay device, which is similar to a DTN. Because of
its flexibility and efficiency, more and more works focus on
mobile crowdsensing in an opportunistic network [8].
B. Incentive mobile crowdsensing
An incentive mechanism is another important issue for
mobile crowdsensing and many works proposed various in-
centive methodology to motivate mobile users participating
in crowdsensing. Usually, there are three types of incentive
mechanism, entertainment as incentives, service as incentives,
and money as incentives. Entertainment as incentives means
sensing service provider motivates mobile users participating
in mobile crowdsensing just like participating in games. Mo-
bile users will feel funny when they contribute their data in
crowdsensing. A difficulty of entertainment as incentives is
making an interesting game attract enough users [9].
Service as incentives will bring some additional services
to participants. A typical method in service as incentives
is exchanging the contribution and consumption of users.
The main problem of service as incentives is modeling the
payoff of both the sensing service provider and participants
consumption in the same services [10]. Money as incentives
is similar to service as incentives while money as incentives
provides money to participants in mobile crowdsensing. It is
more convenient for calculating user payoff based on money
rather than service consumption. However, money as a service
usually increases the cost of the service provider from inap-
propriate strategies or user cheating [11]. However, existing
incentive mechanisms mainly focus on the motivating mobile
user to participate in data collection. Few works consider the
cost of data forwarding in mobile crowdsensing and barely
propose appropriate solutions to motivate it.
C. Software defined wireless networking
Software defined wireless networking is a technology to
decouple the control plane and data plane in wireless networks.
As the management of wireless networks is more complex than
the wired networks in datacenters, many researchers proposed
different solutions to implement or optimize software defined
wireless networking [12].
In wireless networks, spectrum management is an impor-
tant issue which is different from the wired network. Some
works focus on the SDN-enabled spectrum management in
wireless networks. As the controller directly controls all base
stations, the spectrum management becomes more dynamic
and efficient. The controller can change the communication
spectrum between mobile devices and base stations according
to the traffic and other metrics. For opportunistic networks,
the controller can easily set a communication channel for each
pair of mobile devices to improve the network throughput and
energy efficiency.
Another profit brought by SDN paradigm is the flexible
data forwarding strategy. In traditional ad hoc networks, as
the network topology is agnostic to each network node, it is
hard to design an efficient forwarding path for each network
flow. In software defined wireless ad hoc networks, since the
centralized controller is aware of the entire network topology,
it is convenient to design an appropriate forwarding strategy
for very fine-grained flow control. Thus, in SDN-enabled
opportunistic networks, the controller is also able to adjust
the forwarding rule for each network flow.
However, a difficult and important issue in software defined
wireless networks is the southbound communications [13].
In software defined radio access networks, since devices in
access networks are connected to the controller through wired
link, it is similar to the traditional SDN scenario in wired
networks. However, for a MONET and a vehicle ad hoc
network (VANET), since there is no wired connection between
the controller and forwarding devices, it is difficult to spread
the controller’s message to each device on time.
For improving the stability and security of southbound
communications, some works introduce additional networks to
connect the controller and devices in the data plane. Usually,
a cellular network is introduced to maintain the southbound
communications. For example, as most vehicles can access
3the cellular network, the controller can easily deploy the
forwarding rules through cellular links. Therefore, in this
article, we also introduce the cellular links into SDON for the
management of data forwarding and incentive mechanism. As
SDON provides adequate information about data forwarding,
it is possible to motivate mobile users in both data collection
and forwarding.
III. SUSTAINABLE MOBILE CROWDSENSING IN SOFTWARE
DEFINED OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORKS
In this section, we first introduce the main structure and
network management of an SDON. Then, we discuss the
mobile crowdsensing incentive mechanisms in an SDON.
A. Software Defined Opportunistic Network
As shown in Fig. 1, we use a small example to
show the main structure of SDON. First, mobile device
m1,m2, ...., and m7 are organized into an opportunistic net-
work. Access points connect the opportunistic network to the
cloud service. Each mobile device is able to access GPS
satellites to get its position. For supporting SDON, each
mobile device has a connection to a cellular network and a
centralized SDON controller is connected to the cellular access
network. Meanwhile, the controller is also connected to all
access points.
An SDON usually has two control plane, a data plane, and a
control plane. Thus, the data plane consists of the connections
between mobile devices and access points and the control
plane is the SDON controller. As it is not acceptable to transfer
control message through the unstable and high latency links
in the opportunistic network, the southbound communications
between the control plane and data plane are supported by the
cellular access network. As the data traffic in the southbound
communications is very light, the cost of the cellular network
is almost negligible compared to data flows in the data plane.
Based on the SDON structure, we introduce the main
processes in the network management. When device m1 enters
the network, the controller connects to m1 through a cellular
link. Then device m1 will update its position, network address,
identification, etc. As each mobile device will timely check
its position and send the changed position to the controller
during movement, the controller will calculate the forwarding
path for device m1. A forwarding path consists of forwarding
rules in all devices in the path, such as m4 should forward
flow packets from m1 to m8. When a mobile device in the
path receives a new network flow from device m1, it will
request the forwarding rules from the controller. Each rule
has a lifetime setting. When the rule is out of date, the device
will ask the controller for updating. The controller will timely
update the forwarding path and rules of each device. Generally,
as the speed of a moving mobile device is not so fast to leave
the communication range in a short time period, the timely
updating is acceptable. Furthermore, it is possible that the
controller can predicate the future position of each device and
calculate stable forwarding paths to decrease the southbound
communications.
B. Sustainable Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsens-
ing in SDON
With network management in the SDON, it is convenient
to support sustainable incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing
since the centralized controller can accurately measure the
behavior of each mobile device.
In mobile crowdsensing, there are two activities need in-
centivizing, the sensing data collection and data forwarding.
If the users do not participate one of these two activities,
the mobile sensing will become unsustainable. In original
mobile crowdsensing, although it is not hard to acknowledge
the activities of the data collection of each mobile device
through its identification, lost collected data packets can not
be recorded for intensive while the packet loss is inevitable in
data forwarding through the opportunistic network. SDON can
provide a tracking capability to collect statistics of all sensing
data packets in data forwarding. With the packet statistics, it is
convenient to make a reimbursement for users who contribute
in data collection while collected data packets are lost in the
opportunistic network.
Since data forwarding brings additional energy consumption
to mobile devices, users will be hard to forward packets with-
out reimbursements, which results in packet loss. Thus, the
opportunistic network seems not sustainable without incentive
mechanisms for data forwarding. However, the activities in
data forwarding are very hard to be acknowledged by the
crowdsensing providers since the forwarding path of each
packet needs to be determined. In the SDON, as the controller
communicates with each mobile devices, it is convenient to
request forwarded traffic from mobile devices. Meanwhile, as
the controller manage all forwarding paths, forwarded traffic
is also able to be verified from the collected data packets.
As the example in Fig. 1, when device m1 collects data
for crowdsensing, it will send its data to device m3. As data
packets are forwarded to the network interface of device m1,
the number of packets in detailed rules will be updated. The
controller can ask the packet statics from each mobile device.
When device m3 receives the packet from m1, it can decide
whether forwarding the packet to m4. If device m1 forwards
the packet from m1, the number of packets in the forwarding
rule will be updated. If a data packet of crowdsensing from
device m1 is sent to the cloud, the controller can acknowledge
the contribution of each device in the forwarding path from
the rule statics.
Thus, we propose a simple incentive mechanism for mobile
crowdsensing in the SDON. For crowdsensing incentivizing,
the service provider offers some free service quota to users
as reimbursement (incentives) for their contribution. The in-
centive based on the service quota is limited by the specific
service, which is not always able to increase the utility of
users. In our work, we consider the cellular data quota as a
good incentive for mobile users. The carriers provide cheap
wholesale rates for bulk access through business agreements.
It is very appropriate and inexpensive for the crowdsensing
service providers as mobile users usually need to pay for
cellular traffic. The incentive mechanism will increase cellular
traffic of mobile users who contribute in mobile crowdsensing.
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Fig. 1. Mobile crowdsensing in a software defined opportunistic network
When a mobile device collects and sends data to the sensing
service cloud, the sensing service provider will assign some
incentive cellular traffic to the device. Meanwhile, incentive
traffic is also assigned to those devices which contribute in
data forwarding. The main issue of the proposed incentive
mechanism is the ratio between the assigned incentive cellular
traffic and the data in both collection and forwarding. For
higher or lower incentive ratio, the higher cost of incentive
traffic or less collected data will decrease the revenue of the
sensing service provider. In the next section, we focus on
the optimal decision of the incentive ratio in our proposed
incentive mechanism.
IV. SUSTAINABLE INCENTIVE MECHANISM
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we optimize the sustainable incentive mech-
anism for maximizing the payoffs of both the sensing service
provider and all mobile users.
We first study the payoff of each mobile device. Payoff of
a mobile device in mobile crowdsensing consists of revenue
and cost [14]. The revenue of a mobile device comes from
the additional cellular traffic while the cost from the data col-
lection and data forwarding. Let a set M = m1,m2, ...,m|M |
denote all mobile devices and a set T = t1, t2, ..., t|T | denote
all time slots. Thus, we assume each mobile device can decide
sensing data or not while the traffic forwarding is decided by
the controller. Therefore, we use a set Di = di1, di2, ..., di|T |
to denote the decision of mobile device mi and a set Fi =
fi1, fi2, ..., fi|T | to denote forwarded traffic in each time slot.
Let Ec and Ef to denote the unit energy consumption of
data collection and forwarding. The unity function of mobile
device mi from incentive cellular traffic is Ui(·). Therefore,
let PUi denote the payoff of mobile device mi, given by
PUi = Ui(ηi(Di + Fi)) − Ec · Di − Ef · Fi while ηi is
the traffic return ratio from the sensing service provider. The
utility function of a mobile device mi with elastic services
follows the principle of diminishing marginal returns [15],
and the one with inelastic services is a step function such
as Ui(ηi(Di + Fi)) = ui if
∑|T |
j=1 ηi(dij + fij) ≥ Bi, and
Ui(ηi(Di + Fi)) = 0 otherwise, while mobile device mi
downloading Bi bytes of data in a time slot.
Then, we study the payoff of the sensing service provider.
As the revenue comes from the data collected from mobile
devices, we use a revenue function Ri(·) to denote the revenue
from mobile device mi. Let PCi denote the payoff of the
sensing service provider from mobile device mi, given by
PCi = Ri(Di)− α · ηi · (Di + Fi) while α is the unit cost of
cellular traffic.
Therefore, as we assume the service provider and mobile
devices know all information, the optimization problem of the
incentive mechanism can be stated as two stage Stackelberg
game, given by maxηi PCi in the first step and
max
Di P
U
i in the
second step where i ∈ [1, |M |]. In the incentive game, the
sensing service provider is the leader and mobile users are
followers. Meanwhile, we also assume the 0 < ηi < 1 since
the price of the traffic in the opportunistic network is cheaper
than that of cellular traffic.
To solve the Stackelberg game, we use a backward induc-
tion. We first find the best decision of mobile device mi then
solve the best decision of the sensing service provider. As the
second step is a convex optimization, the best decision d∗ij is
resolved by the equation as
dUi(ηi(dij + fij))
ddij
− Ec
ηi
= 0 (1)
while the best decision d∗i =
⋃|T |
j=1{d∗ij}.
To find the best decision in the first step, we use the best
decision in the second step as the value. Since the first step
is also a convex optimization, the best decision η∗i is resolved
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Fig. 2. Incentive mechanism payoffs with a different number of mobile users
by the equation set as
|T |∑
j=1
dRi(d
∗
ij)
dd∗ij
− α(d∗ij + fij) = 0. (2)
Therefore, we can find the best decision η∗i by solving the
equation set of (1) and (2). For finding an elastic solution to fit
different settings, we choose Newton’s method to numerically
solve the equation set.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce the simulation settings
then discuss the results of performance evaluation.
In all simulations, we build a crowdsensing network through
python 2.7 and networkx. We set the numbers of nodes and
time slots are 100 and 5000, while one slot is 1 second which
is a general update period of GPS. The unit consumption of
data collection and forwarding per each time slot is 7200µJ
and 1500µJ from the general power consumption of cell
phones. We set the utility function from the carrier price and
the cost from a smartphone charge station. Thus, the user
utility function is set to Ui(dij) = 43.2mJ/KiB · dij . We set
the revenue function Ri(di) equal to 1.54e−5dollar/KiB ·Di,
which is calculated from the value per message of Whatsapp.
The price of cellular incentive traffic is set to 2 dollars per
gigabyte, which is the lowest price in Japan.
For comparison, we test the payoffs by contribution depen-
dent prize (CDP) from an existing literature [14]. We also test
the payoffs of two original solutions as follows.
• UNIFORM The sensing service provider returns fix
cellular traffic to each participant. Fix cellular traffic is
set to 1 KiB per second.
• SENSING DATA ONLY The sensing service provider
returns cellular traffic to the participant who contributes
in data collection. The ratio of incentive cellular traffic
and collected data is set to 1.
In each simulation, we run the test with 20 times then calculate
the average results.
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Fig. 3. Incentive mechanism payoffs with different time periods
We first discuss payoffs with a different number of mobile
users in the network. We set the number of mobile users
from 100 to 500 and increase the number by 100 in each
step. From the result shown in Fig. 2, the payoff of each
solution is increased with more mobile users in the network.
Meanwhile, the payoff of our solution is two times than the
UNIFORM solution. With an increasing number of mobile
users, the payoff of UNIFORM solution performs worse than
the SENSING DATA ONLY solution since some users who
contribute nothing still receive incentive traffic. The payoff
of CDP model is near to our solution when the number of
users increases to 500, as the opportunity of data forwarding
is higher with more users even without incentive traffic on it.
Then we study the payoffs with different time periods.
We set the number of mobile users to 100, and the number
of time slots from 1000 to 5000, which is increased by
1000 in each step. As shown in Fig. 3, the payoffs of all
solutions are increased by the increasing time periods. Our
solution performs a little worse than SENSING DATA ONLY
solution at the begin and better than that after about 1.5
seconds. UNIFORM solution still performs the worst since
the additional cost on the users without contribution. CDP
solution performs better than SENSING DATA ONLY solution
but worse than our solution.
We also study the influence of the cost of cellular traffic.
We set the number of the time slots to 5000, and the cost of
incentive cellular traffic from 0.5 to 2.5 dollars per gigabyte,
which is increased by 0.5 dollars per gigabyte in each step.
We compare the payoffs in the simulation results shown in
Fig. 4. When the cellular traffic cost is set to 0.5 dollar per
gigabyte, CDP performs better than other solutions. Obviously,
the cost of incentive cellular traffic will influence the payoffs
of the incentive mechanism seriously. When the cost increases
more than 2.5 dollars per gigabyte, the payoff the sensing
service will be less than zero with UNIFORM, SENSING
DATA ONLY and CDP solutions. We also find that UNIFORM
solution can perform better than SENSING DATA ONLY
solution with lower cost on incentive cellular traffic.
In proposed solution, an important issue is the value of the
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ratio between incentive cellular traffic and the total data in
collection and forwarding. As the ratio in (1) is relevant to the
energy consumption of data collection and forwarding, we test
the best decision of ηi with different energy consumption. We
set the cost of incentive cellular traffic is 2 dollar per gigabyte
and choose a node mi for the simulation. Then, we adjust
the value of Ec from 1500µJ to 28500µJ, increased 3000µJ
in each step, and the value of Ef from 150µJ to 1500µJ,
increased 150µJ in each step. We find ratio ηi needs to be
increased with the increased energy consumption, as shown in
Fig. 5. Ratio ηi is increased smoothly with increasing Ec while
there is an obvious fluctuation of increased ηi with increasing
Ef . This fluctuation is because of the varying forwarded data
as we change the network topology in each simulation.
As a result, incentive mechanisms can increase the payoff of
the sensing service provider with acceptable cost on incentive
cellular traffic. However, since original solutions are not able
to motivate users who contribute in data forwarding, UNI-
FORM, SENSING DATA ONLY, and CDP solutions perform
worse than our solution which motivates users in both data
collection and forwarding.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an SDON scheme to improve
the management of mobile crowdsensing. We also design an
incentive mechanism in the SDON. In the optimization of
our incentive mechanism, we first formulate the interaction
between participants and the sensing service provider as a two-
stage Stackelberg game then find the game equilibrium. For
evaluating best strategy in the game equilibrium, we test the
payoff of the sensing service provider in extensive simulations.
The payoff in the performance evaluation results is higher
than the original solutions. In the future, we will implement
a prototype of SDON and focus on the scalable management
of the mobile crowdsensing.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Ren, Y. Zhang, K. Zhang, and X. Shen, “Exploiting mobile crowd-
sourcing for pervasive cloud services: challenges and solutions,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 98–105, March 2015.
[2] L. Kong, L. He, X. Y. Liu, Y. Gu, M. Y. Wu, and X. Liu, “Privacy-
preserving compressive sensing for crowdsensing based trajectory re-
covery,” in Proceedings of 2015 IEEE 35th International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), June 2015, pp. 31–40.
[3] L. Kong, D. Zhang, Z. He, Q. Xiang, J. Wan, and M. Tao, “Embracing
big data with compressive sensing: a green approach in industrial
wireless networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 10,
pp. 53–59, October 2016.
[4] D. Kreutz, F. M. V. Ramos, P. E. Verłssimo, C. E. Rothenberg,
S. Azodolmolky, and S. Uhlig, “Software-defined networking: A com-
prehensive survey,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 14–76,
Jan 2015.
[5] B. Guo, Z. Yu, X. Zhou, and D. Zhang, “From participatory sensing
to mobile crowd sensing,” in Proceedings of 2014 IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
(PERCOM Workshops), March 2014, pp. 593–598.
[6] M. Conti and S. Giordano, “Mobile ad hoc networking: milestones, chal-
lenges, and new research directions,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 85–96, January 2014.
[7] P. Talebifard and V. C. Leung, “Towards a content-centric approach
to crowd-sensing in vehicular clouds,” Journal of Systems Architecture,
vol. 59, no. 10, Part B, pp. 976 – 984, 2013.
[8] Y. Chon, N. D. Lane, F. Li, H. Cha, and F. Zhao, “Automatically char-
acterizing places with opportunistic crowdsensing using smartphones,”
in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Computing,
ser. UbiComp ’12. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 481–490.
[9] N. Avouris and N. Yiannoutsou, “A review of mobile location-based
games for learning across physical and virtual spaces[j],” Journal of
Universal Computer Science, vol. 18, no. 15, pp. 2120–2142, 8 2012.
[10] K. O. Jordan, I. Sheptykin, B. Grter, and H.-R. Vatterrott2, “Identifica-
tion of structural landmarks in a park using movement data collected in
a location-based game,” in Proceedings of The First ACM SIGSPATIAL
International Workshop on Computational Models of Place, ser. COMP
’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 1:1–1:8.
[11] C. Miao, W. Jiang, L. Su, Y. Li, S. Guo, Z. Qin, H. Xiao, J. Gao, and
K. Ren, “Cloud-enabled privacy-preserving truth discovery in crowd
sensing systems,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on
Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys ’15. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 183–196.
[12] C. Chaudet and Y. Haddad, “Wireless software defined networks: Chal-
lenges and opportunities,” in Proceedings of 2013 IEEE International
Conference on Microwaves, Communications, Antennas and Electronics
Systems (COMCAS), Oct 2013, pp. 1–5.
[13] W. H. Chin, Z. Fan, and R. Haines, “Emerging technologies and research
challenges for 5g wireless networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 106–112, April 2014.
[14] T. Luo, H.-P. Tan, and L. Xia, “Profit-maximizing incentive for partici-
patory sensing,” in Proceedings of 2014 IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM), 2014, pp. 127–135.
7[15] C. Courcoubetis and R. Weber, Pricing communication networks :
economics, technology and modelling, ser. Wiley-Interscience Series in
Systems and Optimization. Chichester, San Francisco, Weinheim: John
Wiley & Sons, 2003.
He Li received the B.S., M.S. degrees in Computer
Science and Engineering from Huazhong University
of Science and Technology in 2007 and 2009, re-
spectively, and Ph.D. degree in Computer Science
and Engineering from The University of Aizu in
2015. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow with
Department of Information and Electronic Engi-
neering, Muroran Institute of Technology, Japan.
His research interests include cloud computing and
software defined networking.
Kaoru Ota was born in Aizu Wakamatsu, Japan.
She received M.S. degree in Computer Science from
Oklahoma State University, USA in 2008, B.S. and
Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science and Engineering
from The University of Aizu, Japan in 2006, 2012,
respectively. She is currently an Assistant Professor
with Department of Information and Electronic En-
gineering, Muroran Institute of Technology, Japan.
She serves as an editor for IEEE Communications
Letter.
Mianxiong Dong received B.S., M.S. and Ph.D.
in Computer Science and Engineering from The
University of Aizu, Japan. He is currently an As-
sociate Professor in the Department of Information
and Electronic Engineering at Muroran Institute of
Technology, Japan. Dr. Dong serves as an Editor for
IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, IEEE
Network, IEEE Wireless Communications Letters,
IEEE Cloud Computing, and IEEE Access.
Minyi Guo received the BSc and ME degrees in
computer science from Nanjing University, China,
and the PhD degree in computer science from the
University of Tsukuba, Japan. He is currently a
Zhiyuan chair professor and a chair of the De-
partment of Computer Science and Engineering,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU), China. He
received the national science fund for distinguished
young scholars from NSFC in 2007.
8m1
m2
m3
m6
m4
m8
m7
Sensing Service in 
CloudController
Access Point
Opportunistic Network
m5
Cellular Base Station
Access Network
Fig. 1. Mobile crowdsensing in a software defined opportunistic network
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Fig. 2. Incentive mechanism payoffs with a different number of mobile users
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Fig. 3. Incentive mechanism payoffs with different time periods
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Fig. 4. Incentive mechanism payoffs with different cost on incentive cellular traffic
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Fig. 5. Incentive ratio ηi with different energy consumption in data collection and forwarding
